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Objectivity, the Thing in Itself, Nonconceptual Content & 
Hegel’s Critique of Kant— 
A Reply to De Boer, Blomme, Van den Berg and Spigt 
This paper was originally published in Dutch, under the title ‘Repliek op de kritiek van De Boer, Blomme, 
Van den Berg en Spigt’, in Tijdschrift voor Filosoﬁe 80,2 (2018):363–78. Some references have been left out 
here. Please refer to the published version. 
  
(c) Dennis Schulting, 2018 
In reply to the critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism (2017), I shall proceed 
thematically, addressing four main themes which are also central to my book: objectivity, 
the thing in itself, nonconceptual representational content and Hegel’s critique of Kant. 
This division also neatly corresponds to the focus of the diﬀerent critics. 
 Hein van den Berg raises a very interesting question—namely, about the sense in 
which I suggested that Kant is probably a coherentist (2017:2–3)—which because of lack of 
space I cannot answer here. In any case, I agree with Van den Berg that Kant cannot be 
considered a coherentist in a contemporary sense and that Kant is more of a traditional 
foundationalist. Whether Kant sees truth as correspondence or coherence is a complicated 
matter, which also relates to the question concerning what Kant calls ‘transcendental 
truth’ (see 2017, chs 3 and 4); transcendental truth does in some sense concern a 
correspondence between concept and object or thing (adæquatio intellectus et rei), but one 
that is fully internalised in the transcendental subject—the metaphysical question of truth 
and the epistemology of the cognising subject have here merged into one. This is 
compatible with the view, as Van den Berg suggests, that Kant’s idealism implies that he 
espouses a correspondence theory of truth, at any rate insofar as the truth of empirical 
knowledge claims about appearances is concerned. As Van den Berg himself already notes, 
it is not easy to decide how exactly to interpret Kant’s theory of truth. I want to return to 
this issue when another opportunity arises.  
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1. Transcendental apperception and objectivity  
I conﬁne myself here to the substantial criticisms. First I address the question concerning 
transcendental apperception, which is broached by Karin de Boer. The central thesis of 
Kant’s Radical Subjectivism—and this goes against more traditional realist intuitions, 
which seem ineradicable even among Kantians—is to claim that objects as such do not 
exist outside the transcendental subject and thus outside transcendental apperception. As 
De Boer acknowledges, I claim that transcendental apperception is the necessary and 
formally suﬀicient condition of objective knowledge (note the adverb ‘formally’!, which De 
Boer handily fails to do). De Boer considers this claim untenable because it would make 
Kant into a rationalist. For, as she writes, ‘transcendental apperception [is] a purely 
intellectual activity’—I disagree with this, by the way, because this would mean that 
transcendental apperception only concerns the analytical unity of concepts, and not also 
precisely the synthetic unity of representations in the non-intellectual, sensible intuition, 
regardless of the question whether this intuition is ‘similar to our own or not’ (B148). 
There are two additional subjective sources of knowledge: sensibility and the imagination, 
as De Boer notes, and the imagination cannot be reduced to the understanding.  1
Obviously, I do not deny that sensibility and the imagination are necessary; what’s more, I 
dedicate two whole chapters to the imagination and its absolutely central role in the 
argument of both the A and B Deductions (chs 6 and 7). De Boer suggests she did not 
consider those two chapters, while the titles of those chapters clearly refer to the threefold 
synthesis (in the A Deduction) and the ﬁgurative synthesis (in the B Deduction), and thus 
are important for the critique she directs against my reading, especially with respect to the 
imagination. As said, De Boer also neglects to take note of important words such as ‘at 
least formally’ (twice in her text). I emphasise again and again that what is at stake is the 
possibility of objective, empirical knowledge as depending on transcendental apperception, 
namely insofar as such knowledge can be established a priori as objective. A posteriori 
sensible impressions must thereby be presupposed as necessarily given. Neither the fact 
 Heidegger too thinks that the capacity of the imagination must not be reduced to being a function of the 1
understanding. Heidegger’s reading rests, as is well-known, on the A Deduction. However, as I show in 
Chapter 6, the A Deduction need not be read in the way that Heidegger does. Hegel says mutatis mutandis 
the same, whose critique I address in detail in Chapter 8 of the book. Though I disagree with Hegel’s 
criticism, his interpretation of Kant, that is, that the imagination is merely a function of the understanding, 
is correct. De Boer’s critique of my view rests on her own presupposition that Kant himself makes a sharp, 
not merely formal distinction between the power of the imagination and the understanding, a reading that 
Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s identiﬁcation of the two alone makes implausible. I suspect that on this point De 
Boer is led by her reading of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation. 
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that there are sensible impressions, nor their a posteriori nature, nor the fact that there is 
objective knowledge, nor the material (contingent) nature of cognitive judgements can be 
demonstrated in a transcendental proof (see e.g. chs 3, 4 and 7). Hence I wrote that 
apperception is only formally suﬀicient for objective, empirical knowledge, insofar namely 
as it concerns the form and not the matter of such knowledge.  2
 However, one could still object, as De Boer appears to do, that my thesis cannot be 
right and that transcendental apperception is at the most a necessary and not even a 
formally suﬀicient condition of objective knowledge, for transcendental apperception 
concerns only the principle of self-ascription of representations and does not ground our 
objective representations, let alone the objects of those representations. De Boer in fact 
poses the same question as some other commentators from the recent past:  why would the 3
necessary and suﬀicient condition of self-consciousness (transcendental apperception) also 
be the necessary—let alone suﬀicient—conditions of both the experience of objects and the 
objects of experience (A111, A158/B197)? The reader of De Boer’s piece could be forgiven 
for thinking that I failed to take this question into account and that her critique is 
justiﬁed, but nothing could be further from the truth. It is a central problematic in both 
my ﬁrst book and the book critiqued here, and it was again discussed in an exchange 
between Anil Gomes and myself in Kantian Review.  If one denies that transcendental 4
apperception is also a (formally) suﬀicient condition of objective knowledge (the claim 
namely that Kant makes in B138, the passage I discuss in detail),  a so-called GAP results 5
in Kant’s argument in the Deduction (sometimes this analytic jargon comes in really 
handy!). My solution to the GAP is, put succinctly, to say that (1) transcendental 
apperception is not a psychological principle of representation or consciousness, (2) the 
transcendental unity of apperception is an objective unity, as Kant says himself (B139), 
and (3) transcendental apperception in the guise of the imagination in sensibility (i.e. as 
synthesis of the apprehension, cf. §26) is responsible for the necessary combination of 
spatiotemporal representations, such that we can speak of objective knowledge (or 
experience, with which Kant identiﬁes knowledge [B148]), assuming of course that there are 
 See especially Schulting (2017:77–8). My analysis there of the term Erkenntnis and how it relates to our 2
contemporary concept of knowledge directly contradicts De Boers critique that I conﬂate ‘objective cognition’ 
and ‘empirical knowledge’, as she contends. 
 For references see Schulting, Kant’s Deduction From Apperception. An Essay on the Transcendental 3
Deduction of the Categories (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018), ch. 4. 
 See Kantian Review 23(1) (2018). 4
 I follow Henry Allison’s so-called ‘Reciprocity thesis’ for the Deduction. See Schulting (2018). 5
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objects and those objects sensibly aﬀect us (the factualness of experience and of a world of 
objects is never put to doubt by Kant). Again, it is purely the formal aspect of our 
objective knowledge which is at issue here, objective knowledge qua objective, not its 
material aspect.  De Boer overlooks this crucial aspect. 6
 That which leads to the GAP is the mistaken assumption that Kant talks about the 
material aspects of our objective knowledge (knowledge facts) and, crucially, that 
transcendental apperception is merely the principle of the self-ascription of all possible 
representations (whether or not interpreted psychologically). The traditional reading of 
transcendental apperception is modally ‘excessive’, which I explain ad nauseam in both my 
books. If De Boer were right in her critique, it would directly lead to a multiple GAP (the 
same holds mutatis mutandis for the critique that Henny Blomme presents; see below). For 
she is not able to explain the a priori, internal relation between the various formally 
distinguishable necessary elements of sensibility, synthesis of apprehension, imagination 
and apperception: what connects them, and how can Kant demonstrate that it is the 
imagination that is the suﬀicient condition of objective knowledge?  Is it again another 7
faculty which on a more fundamental level connects everything, a kind of 
‘schminagination’, as Robert Hanna has put it very aptly?  De Boer’s way of presenting it 8
leads to the philosophical problem of an inﬁnite regress in the explanatory grounds. And 
the original synthetic unity of apperception was precisely designed by Kant to avoid such 
regresses in the analysis of possible objective experience. My thesis of Kant’s radical 
subjectivism bypasses this potential inﬁnite regress in the explanatory grounds and shows 
how all formally distinguishable explanatory elements necessarily hang together internally 
(including the categories). Kant must not be read as if he were still thinking along the lines 
of the deﬁnition and classiﬁcation urge of his predecessors. Rather, he should be read more 
in the fashion of a dynamical interpretation such as Hegel’s.  9
 As I explicate in detail in the book, there is nothing outside the transcendental 
apperception of our representations insofar as it concerns objectively valid experience. 
 See also the discussion in Schulting (2017), ch. 7.6
 See again the discussion between me and Anil Gomes, op. cit.7
 Robert Hanna, ‘The Togetherness Principle, Kant’s Conceptualism, and Kant’s Non-Conceptualism’, The 8
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2013/entries/kant-judgment/supplement1.html. 
 See e.g. Hegel’s Faith and Knowledge, which I discuss extensively in Schulting (2017), ch. 8. One could say 9
that Hegel in that sense, because of the semblance of a ‘facultative’ classiﬁcation urge, rightly accuses Kant 
of psychologism or at least the appearance of psychologism, which he inherits not only from Locke but also 
from Wolﬀ and Baumgarten. See Schulting (2017:348). See also my reply to Spigt further below. 
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That is to say, nothing outside our representations simpliciter can function as a justifying 
ground of our knowledge claims. On what does objective knowledge rest? Not on sensible 
facts, not on objects out there, but upon our capacity to apprehend, in virtue of an 
original synthesis, our representations as of a sensible, spatiotemporally intuited object. 
Transcendental apperception is that original synthesis, and apperception is not merely 
‘intellectual’, as De Boer thinks. The ‘intellectual synthesis’ of which Kant speaks at B151 
is a formal abstraction in the analysis, which shows that intellectual synthesis is the 
necessary condition of objectively valid knowledge, whereas ﬁgurative synthesis is the 
suﬀicient condition; but both syntheses are aspects of one and the same principle of 
transcendental apperception, manifestations of the understanding, as Kant clearly says in 
§24 of the B Deduction (see also B153, where Kant speaks of the understanding ‘under the 
designation of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination’). Transcendental apperception 
thus establishes the bridge between the purely rational (the combining of concepts) and 
the sensible, of course by means of the imagination; but the imagination is not another, 
distinct capacity or faculty other than transcendental apperception itself as the act of the 
understanding in its manifestation in the manifold of an empirical intuition. The 
distinctions are formally required for the analysis, but in an actual empirical judgement 
which yields knowledge transcendental apperception always is the imagination which as 
synthesis of the apprehension does its synthesising work (see §§24 and 26 of the B 
Deduction). 
 The only absolute distinction that Kant makes is the one between, on the one hand, 
the capacity for synthesis, which also grounds our conceptuality as such, and sensibility, on 
the other. We can never get immediate access, merely in virtue of our conceptuality, to 
actually existing things. In that sense, sensibility plays a necessary role and provides the 
materially suﬀicient ground of our objective knowledge. But objectivity or objective 
validity, objective knowledge qua objective, is purely a function of our transcendental 
apperception, naturally in the guise of the imagination to the extent that it concerns 
spatiotemporal objects. That is my thesis of Kant’s radical subjectivism, which is not a 
psychological subjectivism, nor an intellectual rationalism, but a transcendental theory of 
knowledge that shows what it means to be able to say, in general, that we have knowledge 
of objects and under which conditions it is possible to say so. De Boer rightly points to the 
role of the categories. While I do talk about that role in the book (in Chapter 2, which De 
Boer says she did not consider), the real story can be found in the 280 plus pages of my 
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previous book, in which I discuss in detail the derivation of the categories from 
apperception and how in this way a relation to an object is established.   10
 Lastly and crucially, De Boer makes an interpretative mistake in thinking that ‘the 
concept “real object”’ plays a positive role in my interpretation. She is apparently confused 
about this putative position of mine because it would ‘undermine [...] the “idealist” 
element’ of my interpretation. However, it is not my position. In the passage that De Boer 
cites, I am clearly talking about a false view shared by many Kantians with a realist 
orientation, who think more along the lines of the traditional theory of knowledge, that is, 
that the categories concern merely our way of experiencing or knowing the object and not 
the object itself (the ‘real object’) independently of our way of thinking or experiencing. 
The question that De Boer subsequently poses—‘So is there a “gap” between our pure 
concepts and the real objects to which they refer after all?’—can conﬁdently be negated. 
As De Boer says towards the end of §2, but means as a critique of my position: ‘In my 
view, the term “real object” does not play a role in this context.’ And nor in my view, and 
I nowhere suggest this. I make it quite clear—for this is precisely the core of my thesis of 
Kant’s radical subjectivism—that outside the categories, outside transcendental 
apperception, no real objects exist (things in themselves do of course so exist, but I will 
come back to this in my response to Blomme below).   11
 As with De Boer, Blomme’s view also runs the risk of an inﬁnite regress in the 
explanatory grounds when he talks about ‘non-analytic transitions’ in the deduction 
argument. Those transitions are indeed non-analytic in terms of the semantic content of 
the argument, but at the level of the analysis, i.e. the deduction argument itself, those 
transitions are very much analytic. There is an ‘analytical connexion’, in the words of P.F. 
Strawson, in Kant’s transcendental argument, otherwise there is no transcendental-logical 
 In his commentary, Blomme says that I ‘make it appear as if [my views] are shared by only a marginal 10
minority, such as the thesis that the categories express the unity of the original apperception and thus can, 
according to Kant, in one way or the other be derived from it’. Well, that last thing is precisely a standpoint 
that is shared by exactly none of my English speaking interlocutors! I’m pleased with Blomme’s support in 
this, but I am afraid that this will remain one of those issues which will separate the classical systematic-
historical Kant scholarship from the analytical approach. Notice, by the way, that the thesis that all twelve 
categories are in fact derived in the Transcendental Deduction is also not delineated by important German 
scholars such as Manfred Baum, Klaus Reich and Michael Wolﬀ, though they are sympathetic to it (this 
holds certainly for Klaus Reich, whose derivation of the logical functions of judgement was the model for my 
own interpretation of the derivation of the categories).
 De Boer further says that ‘I am rather vague about the question about where exactly our empirical 11
judgements get their objectivity’. I ﬁnd this surprising, since, in Chapters 3 and 4, I extensively discuss the 
connection between objective validity (objectivity) and judgement. The fact that my reading did not convince 
her could be due to the fact she has not really captured the radicality of my interpretation of the role of 
judgement, and what this says about objective validity, truth and correspondence.
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sequence of necessarily cohering premisses—the deduction is an a priori argument after all
—and a valid conclusion following from those premises. It is the analytic principle of 
transcendental apperception—from which the steps of the a priori argument proceed—
which ‘explains’, as Kant says (B135), the non-analytic (i.e. synthetic a priori) semantic 
content of the analysis.  
 Blomme subsequently refers to ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’ notions of objective validity, 
of which I would be making use. But in my perspective there is no such thing as a weaker 
and stronger form of objective validity. Neither do I see any textual ground in the 
Deduction that would support such a distinction. Of course, there is—as I make it clear in 
the book—a clear formal distinction between the concept of an object in general and an 
actual, concrete judgement about an empirical object, whether this object is real or not. 
(Naturally, as Blomme says, it can also be an imaginary constructed mathematical object.) 
However, one must then not transpose this distinction, which plays a formal role in the 
analysis of particularly the B Deduction, to reality as if some arbitrary epistemic agent 
literally ﬁrst could have an objectively valid concept of an object in general, subsequently 
employs it in a judgement and then drags in an empirical intuition so as to ﬁnally have an 
objectively valid cognition in its so-called ‘strong’ form. As Kant says, concepts are 
employed only in judgements, not outside of them (A68/B93), and this holds certainly also 
for the categories, which are nothing but functions of judgement insofar as the underlying 
intuition is determined (B143),  and equally for such an oﬀshoot a priori concept as the 12
concept of ‘an object in general’. The concept of ‘an object in general’ is after all nothing 
but the objective unity of consciousness or apperception and the objective unity of 
apperception is nothing but the deﬁnition of judgement in its most essential, i.e. 
objectively valid character.  To say that one can have an objectively valid concept of an 13
object in general independently of how such a concept functions in a de facto empirical 
judgement (whether it concerns concrete, empirical or abstract, mathematical objects) is 
transcendental-logically nonsensical. One should not try to situate a concept that has a 
function in an analysis in an ontological context as if it concerned an isolatable moment in 
concrete experience. 
 That last qualiﬁcation ‘insofar as the underlying intuition is determined’ does not imply, as Blomme 12
suggests, that the categories and the functions of judgement are not identical. 
 I cannot concur with Blomme’s view that the concept of an object in general in its ‘minimal sense’ is the 13
‘unity of any arbitrary conscious representation’. That would imply that any arbitrary representation or series 
of representations that occur is by deﬁnition an objective unity of apperception. This is philosophically as 
well as interpretatively not a defensible position (see Schulting 2017, ch. 4; cf. 2018, ch. 4)
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 As I explain repeatedly in the book, objective validity is a function of judgement 
and of judgement only. Judgements need of course not be about literally perceivable 
objects (one can think of magnetic ﬁelds, which are not perceivable with our senses), but 
objectively valid judgements in the strict sense should always be coupled to possible 
experience. Blomme appears to make a distinction between, on the one hand, objective 
validity and, on the other, the objectivity of cognitive judgements or ‘objective cognitive 
judgements’ [objectieve kennisoordelen]. But it is not clear to me what he means by the 
latter. If he means ‘true judgements’,  then I concur, for as I explicate in detail in 14
Chapters 3 and 4, objectively valid judgements need not be true judgements and true 
judgements need not be objectively valid judgements; put otherwise, objective validity has 
nothing to do with the truth value of a judgement. I can make a false judgement which is 
still objectively valid (e.g. a judgement about a certain object that I perceive, but to which 
I attribute the wrong properties), or I can make a judgement which is not at all objectively 
valid regardless of the question whether it is true or false (e.g. analytic judgements, which 
are not about objects). Blomme uncouples the objective validity of the categories from 
judgement, which in my view is not justiﬁed because categories are in fact functions of 
judgement. I suspect he conﬂates objectively valid and true (factually objective) 
judgements, but if that is true, it is clearly mistaken, for as said not all objectively valid 
judgements are true or factually objective and not all true judgements are objectively valid 
[i.e. analytic judgements, which are actually not real judgements in the sense of Kant’s 
deﬁnition in the Deduction in §19, but rather statements or propositions that have a 
surface grammar similar to proper judgements]. Uncoupling objective validity from 
judgement only leads to such confusion.  Blomme’s analysis takes place on too abstract a 15
level and he confuses the ‘event’, as it were, of judgement with the formal analysis of its 
various constituent elements.  
 The diﬀerence between types of object does not make a diﬀerence to the nature of 
objective validity, which is purely and only a function of the unity of apperception, by 
which judgement is fundamentally characterised, and thus of the categories. An objectively 
valid judgement is a judgement in which the categories are instantiated, independently of 
the question of whether the judgement is true or false. Empirical intuition is a necessary 
 That this is what Blomme appears to mean is suggested by his phrase ‘intersubjectively certain factualness 14
(the being-there)’, which he associates with the objectivity of judgements. 
 This confusion is increased by the fact that Blomme later on speaks of objectively valid ‘judgements about 15
Gegenstände überhaupt [...], in which the categories thus necessarily ﬁnd a certain realisation’, but which are 
‘not automatically objective cognitive judgements’. Blomme reads my interpretation with glasses on through 
which I cannot read. 
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condition of concrete empirical judgements, but it does not furnish anything in terms of a 
justifying ground which is not already provided completely by the unity of apperception, 
which happens in the form of a ﬁgurative synthesis in the manifold of an empirical 
intuition (cf. B151–2). Kant’s theory of knowledge is not an epistemic externalism, but a 
thoroughgoing internalism. Therefore, I do not see a reason to make a distinction between 
‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’ forms of objective validity. What empirical intuition does uniquely 
provide (and this is probably what Blomme means), is real possibility. It is real possibility 
which makes the diﬀerence between judgements about transcendent objects that we cannot 
experience and objectively valid judgements about objects of our possible experience—
which is the real topic of the Deduction. What Kant thus demonstrates in the so-called 
‘second step’ of the B Deduction is to show that the concept of an object in general that is 
conceived in the ‘ﬁrst step’ corresponds to a spatiotemporal really possible object in 
empirical intuition. In a certain sense—and this is of course the actual goal of the 
Deduction—it is only in the second step that the objective validity of the categories in a 
judgement about an empirical object is ﬁrst demonstrated. But this does not detract from 
the fact that objective validity lies in the nature of judgement as such, because it is—and 
this is the core of my account about Kant’s radical subjectivism—the transcendental, 
judging, apperceiving subject which determines the objective validity and nothing else. (I 
fully concur in this with Robert Pippin’s position.) In other words, it is not as if with the 
empirical intuition a little more objective validity were added [to the concept of an object 
as it is employed in judgement]. 
 In any case, Blomme is mistaken to believe that I use ‘two notions of “objective 
validity’ of the categories’ and I do also not go along with his proposal to distinguish 
between the objective validity and ‘the objective realisation’ of the categories. I see neither 
the textual support nor the interpretative requirement for such a move,  let alone for what 16
he calls the ‘subjective validity’ and ‘objective validity of judgements’. Blomme probably 
means by ‘subjective validity’ of judgements the judgements of perception from the 
Prolegomena which are only subjectively valid. But Blomme could have known from 
reading the book that I concur with Konstantin Pollok’s thesis that Kant abandoned the 
theory [of judgements of perception] before the B Deduction. As far as his complaint is 
concerned that I do not suﬀiciently diﬀerentiate between perception, judgement of 
perception, experience etc., I believe that Blomme tries to impose his own ‘layer cake’ 
 Sometimes a distinction is made between ‘objective validity’ and ‘objective reality’, but Kant often 16
conﬂates the two terms.
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model on my reading, a model that following James Conant  I reject. Blomme thereby 17
completely ignores my account of the modality of Kant’s argument regarding perception in 
e.g. §26 of the B Deduction (see Chapters 5 and 7). What he subsequently says about my 
reference to ‘limitation’ in Chapter 9 is unwarranted. Blomme disregards the metaphysical 
context of the discussion in that chapter. For an exhaustive delineation of the function of 
the categories of quantity and quality in the deduction itself, I should like to refer him to 
Chapters 8 and 9 of my previous book. 
2. The Thing In Itself 
Blomme puts forward more interesting points of criticism in his discussion of the thing in 
itself. He wonders if the existence of things in themselves independently of our cognitive 
capacity is at all compatible with my thesis of radical subjectivism. However, it is precisely 
peculiar to radical subjectivism that it is not a psychological or empirical idealism, which 
denies the independent existence of things in themselves. I assert many times that the 
things in themselves and their Sachheit, their reality (cf. A143/B182), are entirely 
independent of the transcendental subject. Put brieﬂy, Being is as such not dependent on 
possible experience. Unfortunately, some of my claims are taken out of context by Blomme, 
which he then sometimes also interprets wrongly.  (He constantly speaks of ‘real 18
reality’ [werkelijke werkelijkheid], ‘genuinely real’ [echt werkelijke], but that is misleading 
because Wirklichkeit and Realität must be kept separate—in contrast to what Blomme 
thinks, in my book a putative ‘real reality’ [werkelijke werkelijkheid] which would reach 
further than the actuality determined in virtue of the categories is not at all at issue. 
Whatever the case may be, Blomme believes that my argumentation is potentially circular. 
Why? According to Blomme, on my view Kant would ‘claim both (1) that Dinge an sich 
necessarily must exist because they are the cause of Erscheinungen and (2) that those 
Dinge an sich exist only insofar as they are Erscheinungen’. That is not what I have Kant 
 J. Conant, ‘Why Kant is Not a Kantian’, Philosophical Topics 44(1) (2016): 75–125. See my account in 17
Schulting, Reﬂexivity and Representation. Essays on Kant and German Idealism (Berlin: De Gruyter), 
forthcoming, ch. 9.
 An example: ‘On p. 42, Schulting talks explicitly about the existence of the Ding an sich as a mere 18
possibility instead of a certainty: “We do represent, by way of its appearance(s), the real thing in itself, which 
exists outside us (if it exists)” (mijn cursivering).’ It is not at all the case that I talk here about the mere 
possibility of the existence of things in themselves. The quoted phrase indicates that we can only say that an 
appearance exists on the grounds of a thing in itself existing, if that thing in itself actually exists so that it 
can appear. What is important here is to take into account the modality of our judgements: if we judge that 
an empirical object x is an appearance E of y, whereby y is a thing in itself, then the judgement that x is E is 
true if and only if x exists, x is E, and y exists. (And this can be regarded independently of the question 
wether the relation between x and y is one of numerical identity.) 
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claim, nowhere; and that is a good thing, for the fact that appearances exist only if things 
in themselves exist in no way implies that things in themselves exist only if appearances 
exist! God, for example, is such a thing in itself that can exist without existing as 
appearance (if he exists). Blomme recounts further: ‘why must we then according to 
Schulting say that the Ding an sich exists, rather than saying that we are necessitated to 
say, as a result of the way in which our understanding works, that if we think the concept 
<Ding an sich> on the basis of the concept <Erscheinung>, we think it [the thing in 
itself] in the ﬁrst instance as existing?’ 
 Blomme commits an error here. Of course does the mere concept <Erscheinung> 
not imply the existence of any speciﬁc thing x, y, z, but I nowhere made this claim. What 
is at issue is to determine that, [in general,] if there are appearances, then there must also 
be things in themselves; and there are appearances, therefore, there are things in 
themselves. This holds also for a speciﬁc given appearance: if there is an appearance x, 
then there must be a thing in itself (or things in themselves) of which x is the appearance. 
We do not just think the thing in itself as existing, we must think it as existing if there are 
appearances or if there is an appearance x—which is the same as saying that the thing in 
itself of which x is an appearance, exists, because if something must be thought as existing, 
then it exists. The existence of the thing in itself is independent of our thinking and it is 
the necessary condition of thought. If the thing in itself were only a thought-concept, but 
need not exist realiter, then appearances could not exist. What is more, if the thing in 
itself (as simple Being, as an ens realissimum, or as a plurality of things in themselves)  19
did not exist realiter, we would neither be able to think it. For the real possibility of our 
thinking rests on the reality of Being (this is broadly taken Kant’s argument in the 
Transcendental Ideal, which is a critical translation of the argument that he already 
expounded in Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund des Dasein Gottes).  20
 This does of course not mean that the mere concept of any arbitrary thing in itself 
implies the existence of the thing in itself or that in an arbitrary judgement S is P the x as 
the substrate of S is posited as existing already with the concepts. But in general it holds 
that things in themselves or a thing in itself must exist insofar as there is thinking at all. 
Hence, Blomme cannot say in general that we only think a thing in itself and thereby need 
not be committed to its eo ipso existence. He cannot deny the latter, because at the least 
he himself, as a thinker, must exist as an existing thing in itself in order to be able to think 
 Kant cannot commit himself to either the plurality or simplicity of the existence of a thing in itself or 19
things in themselves, because he would then go beyond the bounds of possible experience. 
 See further Schulting (2017), ch. 9.20
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a thing in itself (i.e. to have a concept thereof) [or think anything, for that matter]. And if 
he himself exists as thing in itself, then there must be Being, a thing in itself or things in 
themselves which is/are not dependent on thinking, but rather is/are the necessary 
condition of the possibility of thinking. Again, this does not detract from the fact that in 
an arbitrary judgement about a particular thing x the thing cannot yet be proven to exist 
purely on the basis of the concepts that are employed in the judgement: either the thing’s 
existence cannot be proven empirically because no empirical intuition is given (God, soul, 
etc.), or there is an empirical intuition, and so an appearance that refers to the thing’s 
existence, and in the latter case the category ‘existence’ is justiﬁably applied. 
 Blomme does not appear to be wholly sensitive to the subtleties of my modiﬁed 
version of a metaphysical two-aspect reading of Kant’s idealism à la Lucy Allais.  An 21
example. He writes: 
On p. 381 Schulting defends both a version of T1 and T2: “if we experience 
determinate appearances, things in themselves as their underlying ground must exist. 
Strictly speaking, it is not the thing in itself as such that we know exists, but that of 
which we determine in judgement that it exists. Existence (as a category) is ﬁrst 
bestowed upon the thing by the determinative power of the understanding; more 
accurately, the category of existence is applied to the object of experience, the 
appearance, not to the thing in itself as such. But that does not mean that the thing 
so determined does not exist mind-independently, nor that it is not the mind-
independent thing in itself only that is the denizen of Being.” I wonder if the position 
defended in this citation can be coherent. (my [D.S.] underlining)  
Blomme’s reconstruction of my view falters with his premise B3: ‘We do not really know of 
the Ding an sich that it exists.’ This is not what I say or suggest. As is clear from the 
broader context (I talk about the so-called ‘two-aspect’ interpretation in relation to 
judgement), what I claim is that it is not the thing in itself as such of which we know that 
it exists, but that thing of which we determine, in an arbitrary judgement, that it exists, 
namely, as appearance of the same thing that also has an in-itself status. Nevertheless, the 
thing of which we know in a judgement that it exists, but of which we know only its 
appearance, exists (even: must exist) for sure as a thing in itself, even if we do not know it 
as such, namely as regards its in-itself status (and so neither can know its mode of 
existence as thing in itself). For the conclusion that the thing in itself exists if we 
 See Allais, Manifest Reality. Kant’s Idealism and His Realism (Oxford: OUP, 2015).21
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determine its appearance as existing (by means of the category of existence) analytically 
follows from the fact that we determine that the x of our judgement—the thing of which 
we determine that it exists as appearance and is so and so—exists. One cannot determine 
the appearance as existing and deny the analytical implication that a thing in itself exists 
that is the necessary ground of the appearance. That would be a transcendental-logical 
contradiction, so to speak. ‘Thing in itself’ and ‘appearance’ are conceptual attributions of 
something that has an existence in itself and an existence for us, that is, in the manner in 
which it appears (see Allais’s paradigmatic reading in her book). It looks like Blomme 
believes that only an appearance exists and that a thing in itself is merely an object of 
thought. I do not think such a reading plausible nor is it compatible with my reading.  22
3. Nonconceptual Content 
Van den Berg wonders what I, as moderate conceptualist, think about the possibility that 
animals have objective perceptions of objects. Sacha Golob posed the same question in a 
recent discussion of my book. Van den Berg cites Colin McLear’s well-known paper on 
Kant and animal consciousness.  He refers to McLear by saying that ‘the conceptualist 23
can take two positions with respect to non-human animals’. On the one hand, the 
conceptualist ‘can argue that non-human animals are conscious only of their sensations, 
which as a result of a lack of conceptual capacities are experienced as a blooming, buzzing 
confusion’, in the words of William James. ‘Or the conceptualist can argue that non-
human animals do not have objective perceptual representations nor have sensory 
consciousness of objects.’ 
 In my view, these are not the exhaustive possibilities. For the moderate 
conceptualist reserves space for the possibility that animals have representations of objects 
in virtue of the fact that those objects aﬀect their sensible capacities and have in some 
sense consciousness of these, because each representation as such must have an intensive 
magnitude which is >0, which corresponds to the intensity of consciousness. Golob 
formulated his critique of the Kantian conceptualist in such in a way that, because the 
conceptualist reserves objectivity or object-directedness or intentionality for category-
regulated object-directedness—namely, intentionality which is a function of the categories 
of the understanding—he (the conceptualist) must deny that animals are object-directed.   
 Premise B4 in Blomme’s argument is in any case an incorrect interpretation of my reading. On my 22
phenomenalistic account, an appearance can never exist independently of us. 
 McLear, ‘Kant on Animal Consciousness’, Philosophers’ Imprint vol. 11 (15) (2011).23
 13
Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 80,2/2018, pp. 363–78 © Dennis Schulting, 2018
 This makes it diﬀicult, according to Golob, for the conceptualist to explain how it is 
possible that animals are in fact rather well directed towards the objects with which they 
interact. Golob mentions the excellent example of an eagle that, in its swoop and equipped 
with a highly developed eyesight, is precisely directed at its prey and is able accurately to 
diﬀerentiate it from the rock adjacent to it. According to Golob, this requires a highly 
accurate capacity for discriminating complex natural relations. But, the reasoning goes, the 
conceptualist reserves that capacity for discriminating complex natural relations for 
rational beings who comprehend those complex relations as such in virtue of the 
application of categories in judgements. Golob also thinks that my view on objective 
validity as merely a function of judgement runs the risk [of reducing this capacity to 
rational beings], and that on my account animals must be denied the capacity for 
discriminating complex things. In such a perspective, for animals everything would be a 
‘blooming, buzzing confusion’. 
 I do indeed deny that, as Golob sees it, animals are object-directed, which is 
however characterised by Golob as diﬀerent from the category-governed directness by 
which human capacities is characterised. I deny this because object-directedness 
presupposes an explicit subjectivity, that is, a subjective perspective from which the 
subject herself relates, reﬂexively, to an object. If this reﬂexivity is lacking, such as with 
animals, then strictly speaking one cannot speak of object-directedness. Nonetheless doing 
so would in fact be an anthropomorphic projection. Perhaps it sounds plausible to speak of 
an animal’s perspective, but that is again from the perspective of how we make it 
intelligible to ourselves how an animal relates to its environment. The animal, by contrast, 
relates to its environment in an immediate fashion and exactly not in a reﬂexive relation in 
which it itself is conscious of its environment as distinct from itself. This absence of 
reﬂexivity, or subjectivity, does not prevent an animal from having creature consciousness, 
nor does it deny the fact that their objective environment sensibly aﬀects them and that as 
spatiotemporal objects in nature and fully in line with laws of nature they can perform 
complex actions and can react to complex structures and other objects. Of course much 
more could be said about this complex problematic, but unfortunately there is no space to 
do that here. 
4. Hegel’s Critique of Kant 
In his clearly formulated and interesting delineation Joris Spigt connects my account with 
the modern-sceptical problematic and I believe this can be very fruitful. For reasons of 
space, I would like to take this up on another occasion. Here, I want to respond to Spigt’s 
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critical comments on my reading of Hegel’s critique of Kant. Spigt and I are more in 
agreement than he makes it seem. Spigt focuses on my reading of a text passage in Hegel’s 
Faith and Knowledge in which Hegel criticises Kant on a point that concerns the possibility 
of rational cognition. Let me quote that passage in its entirety: 
...the Kantian philosophy has the merit to be idealism insofar as it shows that neither 
the concept alone, nor the intuition alone is something, and that intuition in itself is 
blind and the concept in itself is empty; and that neither the ﬁnite identity of both in 
consciousness, which is called experience, is a rational cognition. (translation mine) 
In the quotation in my text, which Spigt cites, I use the phrase ‘rational 
cognition’ (vernünftige Erkenntnis) from the above-quoted passage in Hegel’s text, not to 
comment on Hegel’s remark, but to make it clear that Kant characterises the identity 
which lies in experience, not as rational cognition, but as a cognition by the understanding 
[Verstandserkenntnis], and that, according to Hegel, Kant is wrong about this. Spigt says 
that in the above quotation Hegel in fact says exactly the opposite of what I am saying, 
namely that Kant is quite right not to regard experience as rational cognition. My 
quotation of that phrase was somewhat taken out of context—i.e. the introductory pages of 
the section on Kant in Faith and Knowledge. Spigt’s formal criticism however ignores the 
context in which I thematised the general critique that Hegel raises against Kant in Faith 
and Knowledge. There, Hegel for sure criticises Kant’s view that the identity that lies in 
experience cannot be qualiﬁed as rational. Put succinctly—for a longer version, refer to my 
book—Hegel accuses Kant of following through on his own reasoning with respect to the 
necessary original synthetic unity that lies in experience, in the connection between 
concept and intuition, in that he identiﬁes that identity, which according to Hegel is an 
absolute one, as a mere mode of the understanding, and so demotes it to a relative identity 
between concept and intuition.  
 In other words, rational cognition does not lie, according to Hegel, outside 
experience, as Kant himself believes, but rather in the relative identity between the 
understanding and the object, an identity established by the categories—however, not qua 
‘ﬁnitude’, as Hegel says in the above-quoted passage. It is the absolute identity in the 
relative identity that points to inﬁnite [rational] cognition. Like Spigt says: ‘an analysis of 
ﬁnite cognition must culminate in in-ﬁnite cognition. For this cognition is always already 
implicitly present in ﬁnite cognition.’ The understanding itself cannot see this and that is 
where the problem lies: according to Hegel, the understanding always thinks in terms of 
 15
Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 80,2/2018, pp. 363–78 © Dennis Schulting, 2018
reﬂective conceptual oppositional pairs and does not see that those reﬂective oppositions 
should not be absolutised, but rather must be reﬂected back unto themselves. That is what 
rational cognition alone is capable of achieving. The inconsistency of intellectual cognition 
is that it does not consistently think through its own arbitrary absolutisation of the 
reﬂective oppositions. According to Hegel, Kant did allude to such a rational reﬂection 
with his notion of the original synthetic imagination, but as Kant, according to Hegel—and 
this is a correct interpretation of Kant (which De Boer for example misses)—sees the 
imagination merely as a function of the understanding, Kant misses the opportunity of 
seeing the rational (vernünftig) potential of the original synthetic unity of apperception.  
 The inconsistency [in Kant’s thought] then lies, according to Hegel, in the fact that 
Kant disregards the absolute identity in his own reﬂections with respect to the synthetic a 
priori as the necessary condition of experience. On the contrary, Kant in fact squanders the 
implicitly present absolute identity by in the end choosing for the ﬁnite understanding as 
‘der Pfahl des absoluten Gegensatzes’ (Faith and Knowledge, 4:323). Spigt says that rather 
than accusing Kant of inconsistency, Hegel shows that a potential is not put to good use. 
By contrast, I see those two as connected, for the unused potential can be demonstrated 
only internally, namely by showing the internal inconsistencies (or contradictions) in 
Kant’s logic regarding the necessary conditions of cognition.  
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